


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will remain restricted to areas where an intergovernmental consensus can be reached. There is no prospect of a genuinely common European foreign policy in the foreseeable future. Likewise, the alleged restrictions of the Constitution have proved to have been exaggerated in law and are no longer clearly supported politically. The objective facts of Germany's geographic position and economic performance mean that gradually the acceptance of a leadership role in Europe – particularly in

building a new relationship with the Central and East European nations – will be inevitable. The question, therefore, is not whether Germany will assume such a role but to what extent it will be shared by other European states in the concept of European integration, thereby preventing the renationalisation of the German foreign policy agenda that will be inevitable if collective security is seen to fail to address the problems of German security for too long.

NOTES

1. Uwe Nerlich, 'Sicherheitsinteressen des vereinigten Deutschland', in Wolfgang Heydrich, Joachim Krause (Eds), *Stabilität, Gleichgewicht und die Sicherheitsinteressen des vereinigten Deutschland*, Vol. III, Stiftung Ebenhausen, 1991, pp. 104–105.
2. A series of focus studies conducted with some 34 West and East Germans by Infratest Burke Berlin in July 1991 identified some of these concerns. They were reported in a study by the RAND Corporation. See Ronald D. Asmus, *Germany in Transition: National Self-Confidence and International Reticence* (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 1992), p. 51.
3. The RAND study, for example, finds on the basis of opinion polls taken in late 1991: 88 per cent of the sample supported German participation in humanitarian measures; 52 per cent agreed with financial support for UN-sanctioned interventions; 58 per cent supported Bundeswehr participation UN peacekeeping missions; only 23 per cent supported Bundeswehr participation in UN-sanctioned interventions like the Gulf war. These results are well in line with any other surveys that have recently been conducted. See Asmus, *op.cit.*, p. 35.
4. See for example, Michael Backfisch, in *Saarbrücker Zeitung*, 16 July 1992; Thomas Kielinger, *Rheinischer Merkur*, 16 July 1992; Detlef Puhl, *Stuttgarter Zeitung*, 5 May 1992; Wolf J. Bell, *Die Welt*, 2 June 1992.
5. For more detail, see *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 23 July 1992, p. 1.
6. *Der Spiegel*, 20 July 1992, p. 29.
7. *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 24 August 1992, p. 4; *Der Spiegel*, 31 August 1992, p. 36; *Financial Times*, 24 August 1992, p. 2.
8. *Der Spiegel*, 24 August 1992, pp. 68–69.
9. David Law and Michael Rühle, 'Die NATO und das "Out-of-area" Problem', *Europa-Archiv*, Nos 15–16, 1992, pp. 439–444.
10. *The Economist*, 3 October 1992, p. 52.
11. Michael Stürmer, 'Deutsche Interessen', in Karl Kaiser and Hanns W. Maull (Eds), *Deutschlands neue Außenpolitik* (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 1994), pp. 39–62.

Macedonia: still the apple of discord

James Pettifer

During the past three years of the Balkan crisis, it has been an axiom from most Western commentators and diplomats that while the war in Croatia and Bosnia was very serious and threatened European Union and NATO cohesion, the ultimate evil in the Balkans would be a war in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia right in the centre of the 'southern arc of conflict'. It has been argued that a Macedonian war would lead to a 'third Balkan war' with Greece and Turkey, the two NATO partners, on opposite sides and thus spelling the end of NATO. The idea of a 'third Balkan war' of course raises the question of the nature of the existing turmoil and violence in the region in the past three years. It is based on the assumption that the war in ex-Yugoslavia has so far been a 'civil war'. This formulation has underwritten European Union policy and has in practice assisted Serbia. According to EU philosophy, a war over Macedonia would be different: it would be between states and therefore, by definition, international.



Map from *The Economist*

In line with this view, considerable Western effort has been put into the stabilisation and demilitarisation of the fledgling state based on Skopje, and international recognition has been granted to it under the name Republic of Macedonia by most Western countries – with the critically important exception of the United States. The flagrant and widespread violations of UN sanctions against neighbouring Serbia organised from Skopje have been largely tolerated by Western powers. Among the European Union members, Germany has been much the most active in promoting Skopje interests, followed by Britain, while France and the Benelux countries have varied in their commitment. The emphasis has been on providing democratic legitimacy and economic stabilisation for the government in Skopje, to be followed, it has been hoped, by a compromise with Greece over the name and flag issues. The culmination of this process was reached in the recent elections in October 1994, which were won overwhelmingly by

the current President, Kiro Gligorov.¹ Western policy has been to resist Greek objections to the state calling itself Macedonia and to certain provisions of its Constitution, and to develop, as far as possible, a viable small country with aid from international financial institutions to stabilise the currency and the economy generally. This ex-Yugoslav republic was seen as a legitimate state threatened by hostile neighbours, very much in line with the traditional concept of the 'Macedonian question' inherited from the Balkan wars of 1912–13. In this framework, Macedonia is surrounded by the 'Four Wolves' of Serbia, Greece, Albania and Bulgaria. Considerable emphasis has, therefore, been placed on border security, with the deployment in January 1993 of a United Nations preventative force of 700 troops, subsequently somewhat increased.² Nearly all the current personnel are from the United States. The force has no mandate to act in the event of unrest within Macedonia itself.

Thus Western policy towards Skopje has been based on assumptions derived, in a very direct sense, from the end of the Ottoman Empire. It has been assumed that surrounding states have traditional irredentist ambitions; that the compatriot minorities in Macedonia are likely to follow the leaderships of the surrounding states in these ambitions; and that social conditions exist in Macedonia, with a dominant climate of xenophobia and militarism, for their fulfilment. This is, in essence, the Macedonian myth, although it should be emphasised that to call it a myth, in the ideological sense, is not to deny that it may contain a deal of political truth. Thus, for example, there was a real military threat to Macedonia from Serbia in 1991 and 1992, with the Yugoslav People's Army as a potential invasion force. But it is not the only view of Macedonia in the region.

Most Greeks, for instance, see the Skopje-based state as a hostile, expansionist military power that threatens northern Greece. It has been EU (but not American) policy to deny any validity whatsoever to the latter view, although it is based on much more recent historical events, such as the Greek–Bulgarian war in 1913 and the 1941–44 Bulgarian puppet government in Macedonia. The EU policy also makes several political assumptions about the democratic potential of the current 'Macedonian state' which may not be tenable much longer. Indeed, it is possible that the republic will have to choose before long which of its neighbours will be its protector.

The current state of FYROM

There have been considerable changes in the economic and political life of FYROM since the original independence referendum of September 1991. At that time, the economy of the Socialist Republic of Macedonia was very closely integrated with that of Serbia, which accounted for over 60 per cent of its trade. The only significant source of foreign exchange – although all of it was controlled by Belgrade – was tourism.

In the last three years, FYROM has not achieved economic viability. After its admission to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in December 1992, and the World Bank in December 1993, substantial international assistance was mobilised for the economy. The principal objective has been to stabilise the exchange rate and reduce the rate of inflation, which in 1992 was in danger of reaching hyper-inflation levels. This programme involved a standby loan of \$80m, after an agreement for economic reconstruction signed in February 1994. This has met with some success in terms of its stated objectives: annual inflation has been cut to about 20 per cent and the denar has stabilised against the dollar. But the cost has been very high. In 1994, the country's gdp

dropped to about 65 per cent of its 1992 level; production fell by nearly 20 per cent in the first six months of last year; and unemployment stands at between 20 and 30 per cent of the total workforce – although this figure is impossible to estimate with any accuracy as many enterprises are technically 'working' but nothing is produced and wages are months in arrears. This figure is likely to rise considerably if the IMF–World Bank initiative to close 23 of the 25 major loss-making enterprises in the state sector is pushed through soon.³

It was against this background that the autumn elections took place and resulted in an overwhelming vote of confidence in Kiro Gligorov as President. But this reinforcement of stability was not reflected in the voting for Parliament.⁴ The nationalist Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation – Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity (VMRO–DPMNE), the largest party in the previous Parliament, boycotted the polls in protest against alleged electoral irregularities.⁵ The radical wing of the main Albanian party, the Party for Democratic Prosperity (PDP), polled well, gaining a majority of the seats taken by Albanians, after the pre-election census had shown that ethnic Albanians made up over 20 per cent of FYROM's population.

It is likely that most of what Mr Victor Comras, the United States liaison representative in Skopje, called 'serious electoral irregularities' affecting the contest, occurred in respect of the PDP candidates. Thus, for instance, its leader, Menduh Thaci, was deprived of a parliamentary seat in Skopje on the third ballot by 10 votes after winning comfortably on the first two ballots.⁶ The PDP leader claimed, plausibly, that numbers of Roma (Gypsies) were moved into his constituency and paid to vote against him. The VMRO nationalists have claimed that large numbers of their supporters in areas of traditional strength such as Stip, Veles and Ohrid were unable to vote at all.

The international observers and monitors provided by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) gave general approval to the conduct of the election, with some reservations, but suspicions must remain of substantial manipulation by the ex-Communist bureaucracy in Skopje's key constituencies, in particular as international observers with little knowledge of local conditions were guided in their work by staff from the FYROM Interior Ministry.⁷

As a result, a de facto one-party government has resulted from the electoral process – perhaps the last result that the EU representatives in Skopje wanted – with pro-Gligorov forces holding about 82 per cent of the seats in Parliament, and the very under-represented opposition threatening civil resistance campaigns. The long-standing Albanian demand for Albanian-language higher education is likely to be a focal point in this. The Gligorov-controlled paramilitary police have already attacked and ransacked the proposed Albanian University headquarters building in Tetovo in December and arrested several leading ethnic Albanian intellectuals.⁸ VMRO claims to have collected 460,000 signatures from Slav-speaking Macedonians who boycotted the second round, calling for new elections. In political conditions such as these, it will be very difficult for the Gligorov government to project itself internationally as a functioning democracy, and the ambitious EU plans for a settlement with Greece after the elections have collapsed.

The regional context

There have been a number of important changes in the orientation of FYROM's neighbours towards it in the past year, and in regional politics generally. In January 1994, Albania's President,

Sali Berisha, played an important role in the radicalisation of ethnic Albanian politics in FYROM by backing the PDP radicals in their efforts to remove ex-Communist sympathisers from the party leadership. Although Berisha has modified his stance a little since, the radicals have consolidated their hold on the party and polled well in the elections, especially in view of the strong domestic and international pressure put on them. EU states have seen Albanian autonomist demands as the catalyst for the disintegration of FYROM and have ignored the highly undemocratic pressures on Albanian radicals from the FYROM Interior Ministry and its agents. But the disintegration of the most basic cultural, educational and medical facilities since 1991 in the Albanian-dominated areas of western Macedonia has played into the hands of the radicals, and it seems very unlikely that the so-called 'moderates' will have a long-term role to play.⁹

It should be noted that 'moderate', when applied to Albanian leaders, usually means ex-Communist, and 'radicals' invariably have a pro-American, pro-market ideology. This leads them to seek very close links with Albania itself. The United States is the principal external power supporting Albanian aspirations, as Russia is now Serbia's protector. In this sense, on important economic issues in FYROM, there is a policy convergence between VMRO, the Slav-nationalist Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation, and the Albanian leadership, despite deep divisions over the political future of the state. EU states' sponsorship of 'moderates' invariably means ex-Communists with links with the old Yugoslavia and, increasingly, a victorious Serbia.

After the imposition of the Greek blockade of the southern border in February 1994, which has been estimated to have cost FYROM more than \$100m so far, European Union protests followed but have almost entirely died down after the Greek government victory in a major legal case against the EU. Greek public opinion remains united behind the government. The demonstration for 'Greek Macedonia' held in Thessaloniki early in 1994 and attended by 1,250,000 people was one of the largest political gatherings ever held in Greek history. Although there is the minority (mostly in the northern business community) claiming to want a settlement, the terms of a compromise settlement as generally defined in Greece would be seen in Skopje as a complete capitulation to Greek demands on the flag and name issues.

The Greek Orthodox church is playing an increasingly influential role in national political life, and for the first time since the Second World War finds itself with policies on national questions that are in harmony with those of the Left. The Church is particularly influential in northern Greece, and the church's de facto alliance with the ruling PASOK party is of inestimable electoral value there to the Papandreou government. It could even open the possibility to PASOK of becoming the natural governing party. The Greek stance is likely to remain one of principled opposition to the Gligorov government, and this feeling is likely to be reciprocated in Skopje, as the collapse of the Gligorov-Boutros Ghali talks immediately after the election showed. Concessions to the Greek position by Gligorov would only bring VMRO oppositionists into the streets of Skopje against the government, while on the Greek side the blockade usefully consolidates public opinion behind a government faced with many difficult decisions on the economic and social front. The Prime Minister, Andreas Papandreou, will have seen the disastrous effect that EU-inspired concessions to the Skopje position had on the previous New Democracy government and will have no wish to repeat the experience.

The election of the ex-Communist Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) to power in Sofia is likely further to reduce European Union influence in this part of the region, and to open the possibility of an increase in Russian influence, so far fairly limited in Macedonia.¹⁰ It will add to the formation of an anti-Turkish Orthodox bloc in the southern Balkans, and as the BSP is close ideologically and politically to the PASOK leadership in Athens, will reinforce Greek influence, already strong in Bulgaria, to a marked extent. Greece is by far the largest foreign investor in Bulgaria and has worked effectively to develop private enterprise, although often in alliance with ex-nomenklatura figures who have close links with organised crime in Sofia. It remains to be seen how far the growing pro-Bulgarian wing in VMRO in Skopje will react to this major regional development. Both in Macedonia and in Bulgaria, VMRO is a right-wing, pro-privatisation movement and one of the failures of the Gligorov government so far has been the almost total lack of progress in this area. It remains to be seen whether the BSP will make progress in this direction in Bulgaria. In this situation, there seems to be every reason for FYROM-VMRO to work to harmonise policies and activity with VMRO in Bulgaria, particularly in the western Pirin area where VMRO has been traditionally strong.¹¹ The increase in Greek influence will also enable Greece, if the worst comes to the worst, to put additional pressure on the Skopje leadership via Sofia in a number of significant ways, such as oil supplies, the language issues, in blocking FYROM in international organisations and personal transport opportunities.

But, given current EU policy, by far the greatest beneficiary from the election result in Skopje and, indirectly, that in Sofia, is Serbia. The ex-Communist nomenklatura in FYROM, who are the principal prop of the Gligorov government, have always owed their traditional position and privileges in the old Yugoslavia to Belgrade. Kiro Gligorov himself was one of the very few Macedonians ever consistently to hold top ministerial posts there. Many links have been maintained, openly and clandestinely, in the last three years. Apart from the legitimate interests of the small Serb minority in FYROM centred on Kumanovo who claim to have their own human-rights problems, there is substantial externally applied Serbian influence in Skopje. Relations between Belgrade and Skopje involving breaches of UN sanctions, some of which involve organised crime, have been crucial in this process. Some strong links remain between elements in the officer corps of the Macedonian army and old colleagues in the Serbian forces. Belgrade newspapers strongly supporting the Milosevic regime are on sale everywhere in FYROM, while it is virtually impossible to find Bulgarian or Albanian equivalents. Serbs, often thinly disguised as 'Macedonians', occupy many key positions in the army, the police and other state bodies. This group is fully aware that Mr Gligorov is an elderly man who occupies a position very analogous to Tito's in the old Yugoslavia. Many of these people see their best long-term future in bringing FYROM back into some sort of new confederation that would safeguard their privileges. European Union policies towards FYROM do nothing to dispel this assumption. The maintenance of this bureaucratic elite in power is as central to Brussels policy as that of Belgrade, even if it involves turning a blind eye to electoral manipulation.

Until now a non-BSP, Western-oriented government in Bulgaria has been a crucial counterweight to Serbia in Skopje. That balance may well now disappear. In Belgrade the renewal of the Milosevic initiative for an Orthodox confederation is clearly designed to link with these people, as a pro-Serb force on the

southern flank.¹² The European Union policy of 'stability', coupled with neglect of legitimate minority rights claims in FYROM and ghettoisation of the new ethnic Albanian political leadership, is objectively assisting the formation of a new Greater Serbia, in which FYROM may either be a component part or a client 'state', in the south, as much as current

Western policy towards Bosnia has assisted this process in the north. It will be hardly surprising if appeals to 'moderates' among the minorities, particularly the key Albanian and VMRO leaders, fall upon deaf ears, when EU policy is now in practice tied to supporting the interests of the most politically atavistic forces in the region.

NOTES

1. See *Macedonian Times*, Skopje, 26 October 1994, p. 6.
2. See 'Macedonia—Handle with Care', by James Gow and James Pettifer, *Jane's Intelligence Review*, September 1993, p. 387. The basic American military commitment does not appear to have changed in scale or scope over the last year, although there is considerable anecdotal evidence of greater CIA involvement in its operations. If true, this would mirror developments in Albania, where the CIA has taken over the largest air base in the country near Lezha, for flying unmanned aircraft over Montenegro and Serbia. See article by S. Marx on the Albanian military, *Jane's Intelligence Review*, September 1994, and ensuing correspondence in the issue of December 1994.
3. See *Nova Makedonija*, Skopje, 24 April 1994, p. 6. According to official estimates, there are currently 397,542 people employed in FYROM. Of these, some 185,400 are expected to have lost their jobs by the end of 1995. *Australian Macedonian Herald*, 3 January 1995.
4. See *East European Newsletter* (London), Vol. 8, No 2, November 1994, for the clearest analysis of the electoral manipulation process, and of the loss of credibility by CSCE observers—the Head of the CSCE in Skopje, Mr Norman Anderson, in particular. Mr Anderson has subsequently left his post.
5. See *GLAS* (Skopje), Vol. 4, No 19, October 1994, for information on VMRO's position prior to the election.
6. Speech by Mr Victor Comras, US Liaison Representative in Skopje, at a public meeting to discuss US policy towards FYROM, 7 December 1994. Also report in *Nova Makedonija*, Skopje, 9 December 1994, p. 3.
7. Increasing disquiet is being felt in FYROM about the democratic accountability of the Interior Ministry, and in particular the political role of the Interior Minister. VMRO has claimed that several of its activists have been attacked by Interior Ministry paramilitaries in the last year, in Bitola and Ohrid in particular. For Albanian views on the validity of the elections, see *Rilindja*, Zurich/Tirana, throughout November 1994.
8. See *Kosovo Information Bulletin*, London, 15 December 1994.
9. According to official Ministry of Education statistics in Skopje, in 1990 there were 2,518 secondary-school teachers in the Albanian language in the old Socialist Republic of Macedonia within Yugoslavia. In 1993, this number had dropped to 502. Albanians claim that this number is a considerable overestimate, as many posts are not filled.
10. See Elizabeth Barker, *British Policy in South-East Europe in the Second World War*; for historical background on the conventional Soviet role in the region in these and similar circumstances. There seems little reason to believe a democratic Russia will behave differently, given the support offered to Serbia in recent months.
11. See *Balkan News* (Athens), 4 May 1994, p. 9–10. It is likely that Greek influence over the BSP government will make disputes of this kind, central to a good FYROM–Bulgarian relationship, much more intractable in the future. It remains to be seen, however, whether Greece will be strong enough in Sofia to stop the development of new transport routes across the southern Balkans, linking Albania, FYROM and Turkey, which could prove to be the economic salvation of FYROM, although placing the country firmly within the Turkish sphere of influence.
12. The Milosevic proposal for a joint Greek–Serb confederation is not new. See *Politika* (Belgrade), 4 July 1992. At that time the proposal was bitterly attacked by the FYROM Deputy Prime Minister, Dr Blaze Ristovski, who said: 'The times when Greece and Serbia can make decisions about Macedonia are past. Milosevic and Mitsotakis cannot possibly think of repeating Bucharest and Versailles.' *Politika* (Belgrade), 17 July 1992.

Books

Back to basics in Europe

Jean Monnet: The First Statesman of Interdependence. By François Duchêne (London: W.W. Norton, 1995). 478 pages. £22.

This wise, original and timely book should be read and pondered – not only by anyone interested in Jean Monnet, but also by everyone concerned with the European Union today. Based on personal knowledge, deep reflection and diligent research, it paints an honest, warts-and-all portrait of a quite extraordinary man who influenced all our lives whether we know it or not; and it tells or implies, in lucid and compelling prose, a number of home truths about European integration that in Britain, at least, are seldom heard in a parochial cacophony of scare-mongering, misunderstanding and downright disinformation.

'He was born,' as Duchêne reminds us, 'in Cognac on Friday, November 9, 1888, in the era of horse-drawn carriages. He died in his ninety-first year, in the country not far to the west of Paris, on Friday, March 16, 1979, ten years after the first man landed on the moon.' And if his life spanned a time of immense changes, he himself was instrumental or involved in a surprising number of its key political innovations. A quick reminder may be useful. In 1914, aged 26, he told the French Prime Minister that as

regards supplies and munitions France and Britain were fighting separate wars – and was appointed to sort things out. In 1919 he became Deputy Secretary-General of the League of Nations, where among other things he helped sponsor Austrian reconstruction and healed the Polish-German rift over Upper Silesia. In 1922 he returned to Cognac to restore the family brandy firm, and became an international banker, negotiating loans to help the recovery of Poland, Romania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria in what John J. McCloy long afterwards likened to a 'mini Marshall Plan'. He made a small fortune in America, but lost most of it in the aftermath of the Wall Street crash. He helped to liquidate the Swedish match empire of the fraudulent Ivar Kreuger; then in 1933 he went to China to help organise finance for economic development, notably through the railways.

In 1938 the French Prime Minister Edouard Daladier sent him on a secret mission to President Roosevelt to seek American aircraft for France – orders transferred to Britain in 1940 when France fell. In 1939, Monnet successfully proposed to both Allied governments that he should resume his First World War task of coordinating supplies; and in 1940, on the brink of France's disaster, he persuaded Winston Churchill to make the offer of Franco-British union that might have kept the French govern-